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CASE COMMENTS
it appears to afford a large degree of flexibility in the realignment
of corporate affairs, while at the same time containing adequate
safeguards against its use merely to avoid taxes.
Raymond Albert Hinerman
Property-Involuntary Partition of Jointly Owned Property
P and D were husband and wife who took title to land by a deed
which provided that they hold,
... as joint tenants with right of survivorship . . . it being
the intention of the parties . .. that (unless the joint tenancy
hereby created is severed or terminated during the joint lives
of the grantees herein) . . . the entire interest in fee simple
shall pass to the surviving grantee ....
P filed a bill seeking to have the property sold for division, and the
trial court ordered the property sold. Held, reversed. During the
joint lives of the parties the property was not saleable for division
over the objection of either party. Bernhard v. Bernhard, 177 So. 2d
565 (Ala. 1965).
Partition had its origin in the common law courts, and the purpose
of the preceeding is to enable those who own property as joint
tenants or coparcerners or tenanats in common to put an end to
the tenancy in order to vest in each a specific property or an
allotment of the lands or tenements. 4 THomvmsoN, REAL PRoPERTY
§ § 1781, 1822 (1961).
A suit for partition can be maintained only by a party or parties
having a title or equity in an interest in the whole of the property
to be divided. Pierce v. Pierce 4 MI. 2d 497, 123 N.E.2d 511 (1954).
Thus, a remainderman cannot maintain such an action. Hartman
v. Drake, 166 Neb. 87, 87 N.W.2d 895 (1958). A tenant for life is
not entitled to maintain partition against reversioners, remainder-
men or others having a future conditional interest. Fehringer v.
Fehringer, 212 Term 75, 367 S.W.2d 719 (1963). The law concern-
ing partition of property in which there is an interest in remainder
is correctly stated in the principal case; however, there is some
question as to whether there was in fact any interest in remainder
involved in this case.
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Before proceeding to make a partition it is the duty of the court to
ascertain what estates exist. Dingess v. Marcum, 41 W. Va. 757, 24
S.E. 624 (1896). The test of jurisdiction in a partition suit is the
relationship of the parties to the land sought to be partitioned. If
there exists one of the forms of cotenancy mentioned in the statutory
provision for partition, the court has jurisdiction. Woodrum v.
Price, 100 W. Va. 639, 131 S.E. 550 (1926).
The deed construed in the principal case expressly provided that
P and D held as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Also
there was express provision that the parties intended that the entire
interest pass to the surviving grantee unless the joint tenancy was
severed or terminated during the joint lives of the parties. Avowed-
ly attempting to give effect to the intention of the parties, as
determined from the language used in the deed, the Alabama court
construed the deed as creating (1) a tenancy in common while
both the parties lived and (2) a remainder in the survivor. It was
the opinion of the court that this construction was consistent with
similar cases in other jurisdictions. Finch v. Hayes, 144 Mich.
352, 1.07 N.W. 910 (1906). In the Finch case, which concerned a
deed similar to the one in the principal case, the deed was similarily
construed to make the grantees joint tenants for life with a con-
tingent remainder in the one who survived.
Under recognized rules of construction a devise to named persons
without words of limitation carries the fee absent indications to the
contrary; thus a devise to persons as joint tenants will carry the
fee unaffected by subsequent words of dubious meaning or mere
desire. Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1960).
Many states have abolished joint tenancy as it was known at
common law, and when two or more persons hold an estate
jointly they hold without the right of survivorship. The concept of
survivorship is retained, however, in the event that it was expressly
provided in the instrument which created the tenancy, that the
tenancy is with the right of survivorship. Gladieux v. Parney, 930
Ohio App. 177, 106 N.E.2d 317 (1952). West Virginia, as most
states, has a statute providing that on the death of a joint tenant his
interest in property shall descend or be disposed of as if he had
been a tenant in common. W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 19 (Michie
1961). The West Virginia Code further provides that section nine-
teen shall not apply when it is expressed in the instrument creating
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the tenancy that the survivor shall receive the interest of the tenant
who predeceases him. W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 20 (Michie
1961). Alabama has similar statutory provisions. ALA. CoDE tit.
47, § 19 (Michie 1958). The reason for these statutes is to protect
the unwary so that he will obtain an inheritable estate unless it
appears that he should have known he was not obtaining an in-
heritable estate. Brown, Some Aspects of Joint Oumership of Real
Property in West Virginia, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 227 (1961); see
generally Brown, supra; Merricks, Joint Estates in Real Property
in West Virginia, 61 W. VA. L. REv. 101 (1958).
In Wartenburg v. Wartenburg, 143 W. Va. 141, 100 S.E.2d 562
(1957), lots were conveyed to the husband and wife, "for and dur-
ing their natural lives, as joint tenants with remainder in fee to the
survivor," and, "as joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The
West Virginia court held that the husband and wife took title to the
land as joint tenants. There was vested in each an undivided
one-half interest in the properties conveyed, subject to the survivor-
ship rights of each other. The action in the Wartenburg case was
brought by the husband for the purpose of making partition of the
land which he and his wife held as joint tenants. The West Virginia
court held that partition of real estate may be compelled where
one or more of the owners hold as joint tenants.
The principal case probably would have been decided differently
according to West Virginia law, because the language used in the
deed would not create interests in remainder in land located in
West Virginia.
John L Rogers, II
Torts-New Action for "Wrongful Life"
P's mother, a patient in a New York state mental institution,
was raped as a result of the alleged negligence of the institution in
failing to protect her from attack. As a consequence, P was con-
ceived and brought this action in tort against the institution for
suffering the stigma of illegitimancy, being deprived of property
rights and for lack of support and rearing. The state moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Held, motion denied. An
actionable tort was committed upon the infant P simultaneously
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